its air of calm, serious, dispassionate scholarship, its obvious thoroughness, and its scientific precision might discourage later scholars from pursuing these important questions. I also became worried that Currie had slighted-even overlooked!-the legitimate claims of others to the honors he bestowed on Gabriel Duval [l] . Could it be that Currie's efforts were simply pseudo-science employed in the pursuit of some predetermined plan to award Duval[l] the coveted prize without serious consideration of candidates so shrouded in obscurity that they escaped proper attention even in a contest of insignificance? Could it be that Currie's use of objective indicators, such as PPY, IPP, and EHH?, was intended to divert attention from the restricted scope of the study and the proper limits on the reliability of the conclusions? Could it even be that Professor Currie's work is simply a subtle method of defending the propertied classes from scrutiny by an enlightened intelligentsia? To find insignificance embedded in our early post-revolutionary history may dull the revolutionary appetite, and to read articles like Currie's may divert time from preparation for the next revolution. 6 I therefore attempted to incite my colleagues to carry Professor Currie's preliminary study to fruition. Alas, few of them wanted to learn the complete truth about Gabriel Duval [l] and his rivals. My curiosity could not be slaked without learning more, however, and if no one else would do the work, I would have to do it. Besides, I comforted myself, this would be at least as enlightening as spending an equal amount of time playing video games.' So I set off to find more evidence.
The first step was to determine the universe of cases within which to judge insignificance. Professor Currie chose early constitutional law, which was not only fitting, because it is his specialty, 6 Pseudo-science in defense of class interests is of course rampant in legal work. For proof of this see Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REV. 561, 675 (1983) ("The social sciences they perverted into the source of argumentative ploys with which to give arbitrary though stylized policy discussions the blessing of a specious authority."). It's a shame that Unger does not offer us any examples of the work "they" have "perverted"; we probably could learn a lot from "them." It is safe to say, however, that but also simple for him, because he has recently surveyed all of the constitutional cases of the Court's first century.' I agree with the "early" part of the choice: Justices who sat after the Civil War have been handicapped in the quest for True Insignificance by law clerks, secretarial staff, typewriters, and the fact that the problems they faced are more likely to be important, or worse, remembered, today (and hence the Justices more likely to be Significant).
I am less inclined, though, to go along with the limitation to constitutional law. It was a small part of the early docket, a part especially likely to appeal to Chief Justices and therefore likely to show the Associate Justices at their best (that is, at their most silent) in this contest. The Associate Justices were more likely to mar their records by writing in some other area. My first response was to add securities and antitrust law to Currie's list and see how the Justices rated with a broader set of cases. It soon became clear, however, that the set of all constitutional, antitrust, and securities law cases and the set of all constitutional cases before 1865 are the same. To conduct any inclusive survey, then, I would have to add diversity, admiralty, and general federal question cases, and so I did. I have examined (or at least counted) every opinion written in every field through December Term 1863, Chief Justice Taney's last, in a relentless search for the trivial, the transient, the taciturn, and the tergiversating.
Any survey of insignificance of course raises the question of comparability with earlier surveys. Professor Currie is not the first to inquire into the accomplishments of our least distinguished Justices, and a Justice could not truly be said to be insignificant if he has achieved recognition elsewhere. Indeed, a Justice recognized twenty years ago as the "most insignificant" probably no longer could lay claim to that title: he would be the possessor of a title ("Most Insignificant Justice") that would set him apart from other Justices who had done equally little but escaped such notice. The award of the much-coveted, prestigious Most Insignificant Justice title disqualifies the incumbent from repeating in a later survey. 9
8 The first three of these articles, even more seminal than his piece on insignificance, have appeared in this Review. Currie The most interesting of these surveys is one from 1970, which classified the Justices into five categories: Great, Near Great, Average, Below Average, and Failure. 10 The survey is far from satisfactory. The respondents were not told what the ratings mean, and the curious segmentation of the results-most nineteenth-century Justices are lumped into Average, while twentieth-century Justices are pushed to the extremes-suggests that the respondents had not heard of many of the Justices and gave us their opinions on Currie's BVD (Benightedness of View) scale rather than on more appropriate measures of excellence.
Still, the survey is not useless. We may disqualify at once the eight who were rated as failures. These worthies are not insignificant. After all, the respondents in the survey had heard of them and knew enough to object to them. We also may disqualify those rated below average. Again, at least twenty percent of the respondents had heard of them, so they flunk the EHH? test. Moreover, the below average category appears to be filled with Justices who met premature deaths or resigned shortly after being named; whatever else is true of these short-lived Justices, they have no better claim to true insignificance than the seven people who were nominated, were confirmed by the Senate, and refused to serve. 1 1 Indeed they have less: the six below average Justices at least did something, whereas scores of years passed without the seven refusers contributing a single significant opinion. We must, then, find the Most Insignificant Justice among those rated average, signifying that the respondents had no opinions about them one way or the other. Justices Clifford, Duval[l], Livingston, McKinley, and Todd, among Currie's other candidates, can be found there. One might add to the list Associate Justice William Cushing, who was nominated and confirmed as Chief Justice in 1796 but refused to assume that post, pleading old age. That did not prevent him, however, from spending another 14 unproductive years on the Court as Associate Justice. His single fortunate act of declining the post disqualifies him from being Most Insignificant: had Cushing taken the job, John Marshall never would have become Chief Justice, and we would be living in a much changed nation. Cushing also had an OPO, see infra Appendix A, three times that of Duval [l] and Todd, and he wrote a number of significant opinions before John Marshall became Chief Justice.
[50:481 Perhaps, though, this assumes that only Justices who are insignificant for a long time are entitled to the honor. Some men achieve insignificance; others have insignificance thrust upon them."' On what grounds are we to reject the claims of those who were appointed at age fifty-five, were expected to serve twenty years, and were silent for most of that period because of premature resignations or death? Are we to disfavor these contestants, to deny them the prize merely because others, equally inept, lingered on and cast a few votes in their declining years? (I am willing to assume, but only for the sake of argument, that such Justices as Gabriel Duval[l] had better years from which to decline.)
In other words, why are we to assess insignificance ex post rather than ex ante? Why not assume that a Justice who left the bench prematurely would have continued to produce at the same lethargic pace for his expected life span? A broad, representative spectrum of legal and economic commentators, discussing a large number of questions, have proven beyond question that ex ante analysis is the appropriate way to look at legal matters. 1 3 That this view has been so widely accepted supports its application here as well. A short but incredibly productive spurt of utter silence might be more insignificant, especially in promising years of the same, than a long career full of whispering. On an ex ante approach we might award the honors to Alfred Moore by acclamation. Justice Moore, who delivered one brief opinion 1 4 during his four placid 302 14 The Eliza, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 39 (1800). Some might say that the elegance of the opinion disqualifies Moore. The case involved a claim for salvage of a U.S. vessel captured in March 1799 by a French privateer and retaken in April by the claimant. A statute permitted a salvage award of one-half of the value of the vessel if it had been in the hands of an "enemy," and the question was whether the French privateer was an "enemy." Moore wrote:
It is, however, more particularly urged, that the word "enemy" cannot be applied to the French; because the section in which it is used, is confined to such a state of war, as would authorize a recapture of property belonging to a nation in amity with the United States, and such a state of war, it is said, does not exist between America and France. A number of books have been cited to furnish a glossary on the word enemy; yet, our situation is so extraordinary, that I doubt whether a parallel case can be traced in the terms, showed every promise of setting a standard of passive irrelevance for centuries to come; only his resignation prevented him from fulfilling his pledge.' 5 Nonetheless, the ex ante approach to assessing insignificance seems fraught with danger. A Justice who starts out his career in quiet observation, and so might achieve true insignificance if his health permits a long tenure, also might have a stroke, change of heart, or even a political conversion and begin spewing forth bilge, thus turning himself from an historical footnote to a rollicking calamity. To make matters worse, a Justice who resigns or dies before his time has by that very step done something out of the ordinary-in other words, he has committed a Significant Act by upsetting political expectations. He wrecks the plan crafted by the President who appointed him, and he mobilizes the President and the Senate at a moment's notice. We are in the big leagues 16 of insignificance here. So many Justices have a plausible claim to be the Sultan of Sloth, the Titan of Torpor, that a single significant act in a judicial career is disqualifying. Thus the early-departers are out of the running.
17
This approach also disqualifies Justice Clifford, one of Professor Currie's favorites. Clifford attracted attention, lots of it, by his preposterous irrelevancies and obstreperous posturing. He was certainly not invisible, and invisibility is the hallmark of True Insighistory of nations. But if words are the representatives of ideas, let me ask, by what other word, the idea of the relative situation of America and France could be communicated, than by that of hostility or war? And how can the characters of the parties engaged in hostility or war, be otherwise described, than by the denomination of enemies? It is for the honor and dignity of both nations, therefore, that they should be called enemies; for it is by that description alone, that either could justify or excuse the scene of bloodshed, depredation and confiscation, which has unhappily occurred .... Id. at 39. Lest these unfortunately well-turned sentences disqualify Moore, I ask: who is more insignificant, a Justice who writes well but maintains a selfish and withdrawn silence, or a Justice who writes poorly but, with the public interest at heart, allows his colleagues to carry the burden of expression?
18 Two other Justices delivered but one opinion each (see infra Appendix A): Chief Justice Rutledge, whose brief seriatim opinion in Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 133, 169 (1795), is so trivial that it is sometimes said that he wrote nothing at all, and Thomas Johnson, who got off an opinion of less than half a page in 1792, Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 405 (1792), before deciding to take things easy by resigning.
These are both impressive achievements, but they do not rival Moore's. His OPY (opinions per year) of 0.25 is considerably lower than that of Rutledge (1.00) or Johnson (0.50), see infra Appendix A, and we must assume in an ex ante analysis that Moore would have maintained this lead had he remained on the Court.
6 Whether of baseball, as Professor Currie suggests, or of tag-team wrestling, as a less kind observer might think, I leave to the reader. 17 So the sport might turn out to be track rather than baseball or wrestling.
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nificance. To have a reasonable claim to the title, one high on the Inanities Per Page (IPP) scale must be low on the Pages Per Year (PPY) scale, or some other measure of frequency of output. IPP is useful only as a tie-breaker among Justices with similarly meager levels of expression. With Clifford falls Henry Baldwin, a long-surviving Justice who alternated between periods of sullen quietude, sometimes delivering oral opinions but refusing to allow the Reporters to publish them, and bilious but absurd writings. 1 8 Baldwin's work is of no conceivable significance, and he had no effect on his colleagues or on the course of decisions," 9 but the Justice was sufficiently colorful that he cannot be taken seriously in this contest. Enough has been said to produce a narrow field. Justices whom Professor Currie found to be significant even though short of words have committed disqualifying acts. On the other hand, the Justices who sat silently through term after term of constitutional decision making-Cushing, Duval , dissenting) ("the Court's 'choice' is an absurdity") and id. at 2139 n.27, 2141 n.30 (opinion of the Court) (the dissent's arguments "are little more than exercises in the art of ipse dixit" and "are substituted for useful constitutional analysis"). On the current role of majority opinions, see Dobbert v. Flordia, 432 U.S. 282, 311 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I assume that [the majority opinion in] this case will ultimately be regarded as nothing more than an archaic gargoyle. It is nonetheless distressing to witness such a demeaning construction of a majestic bulwark in the framework of our Constitution."). On the current role of dissenting opinions, see United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176-77 n.10 (1980) ("The comments in the dissenting opinion about the proper cases for which to look for the correct statement of the equal protection rational-basis standard, and about which cases limit earlier cases, are just that: comments in a dissenting opinion.").
must be found to decide among the rest. One possible indicator is the treatment of these candidates by scholars of the Court.
Professor Currie refers us to Beveridge's biography of Mar- Abraham finds Brockholst Livingston (of the "tomblike silence" 2 8 ) "to be an able, thoughtful, delightfully humorous, and learned member of the Court during his seventeen years there. '29 Abraham does not grace us with any of Livingston's better jokes, but the spirit is obvious. McKinley is portrayed as "colorless," 3 0 an apparent assertion that albinism and its complications were responsible for his frequent absence from the bench, and Todd is said to have "established but a modestly distinguished record on the Court."'" Clifford, according to Abraham, was "an able lawyer and legal scholar who had been a distinguished representative in both the Maine and United States lower houses. . . . Clifford served on the Court competently and diligently but without particular distinction. Perhaps all this just shows that before beginning work on his book Abraham had acquired a word processor with a free supply of encomiums and had set out to minimize his costs of writing. Nonetheless, his views should give us pause. What are we to make of these two divergent stories: Abraham's, in which no Justice is below average, or Currie's, in which at least seventy percent of the Justices are below average and a good fifty percent are in the bottom quintile?
We could look at the treatment of these contenders by their contemporaries, but that provides scant evidence. They were all such wallflowers that they escaped much contemporary notice. True, Jefferson did say of his appointees (William Johnson, Livingston, and Todd) that they served among "a subtle corps of sappers and miners" consisting of a "crafty chief judge" and "lazy or timid associates. 35 What to make of the delay? Did no one notice his absence?" 6 Or did it just take fourteen years to find someone willing (or able) to say anything warm and gracious in public about Justice Todd? That the remarks are attributed to an anonymous "judicial friend" suggests something of this sort. (I put to one side the possibility that Todd continued to sit in the fourteen years after his death, albeit with the same effect on our jurisprudence as his work in the seventeen years before his death, and then wrote his own eulogy. This would be a Significant Act, but some things are too fantastic to take seriously. The evidence from contemporary reports is too spotty to be the basis of an informed judgment. Thus I was compelled to do what professors of law dread: turn to the facts. I surveyed the decisions of the Supreme Court through the end of Chief Justice Taney's service, collecting the data necessary to make a definitive judgment about significance. How many opinions did each Justice write? How long were they? How many dissents did each write, and how many other dissents were noted by the Reporters or by other Justices? How many opportunities did each Justice have to express opinions? In early years the Court heard fewer than ten cases per Term, but in later years it heard more than eighty. Insignificance is relative, and an output sufficient to hold one's own in 1800 might be deemed trifling for a Justice sitting in 1850.
These data are collected in Appendix A. They show, as one might expect, that as the years went by the Justices became more vocal (more opinions), more wordy (longer opinions), and more contentious (more dissents). The data also offer insights into the insignificance of the contenders. Gabriel Duval[l], far from uttering simply "DuvALL, Justice, dissented," 8 wrote eighteen opinions, fifteen of these for the Court. Thomas Todd, although silent in constitutional matters, wrote fourteen opinions, twelve for the Court. Brockholst Livingston was even more active, producing forty-nine opinions, including seven dissents; several of these fortynine concerned important issues of the day. His activities on the Court, together with Currie's admission that Livingston wrote significant opinions on circuit, 9 disqualify him from further consideration. And even John McKinley, fabled for his absence from the bench, 4 0 was a producer (of sorts) when he showed up for work. He wrote twenty-two opinions during the eleven Terms he attended, and as Appendix D shows, a number (a small number) of these decision, with Harold Leventhal "voting" with the "majority" and filing a concurring opinion 37 days after his death), cert. opinions were in significant cases., 1 The most useful measure of significance (other than a detailed examination of every opinion) is OPO, or opinions per opportunity. This index compensates for the fact that the earlier Justices had fewer opportunities to express themselves simply because the Court heard fewer cases. The OPO of most members of the early Court was quite high, with Jay achieving an OPO of 0.38 (three opinions in eight cases), and even the maligned Thomas Johnson, who wrote but seventeen lines in his career, had an OPO of 0.17 ( These fine figures are the product of hard work. Todd, who reached the Court five years ahead of his archrival Duval[l], acted quickly to make the most of the lead, doing nothing whatsoever the first two years. He wrote less than a page in the first six. Duval[l], on the other hand, was conscious of the need to preserve 41 McKinley's dissenting opinion in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839), supporting a position he had taken on circuit, is probably enough by itself to disqualify him from further consideration. So, too, is his opinion in The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 452 (1849), which was necessary to allow the Court to achieve a majority.
Although it is true that McKinley "made no significant contribution to legal thinking in any form" and that "[w]hen he died in 1852 he had not made any notable imprint on the work of his profession," C. SWISHER, 5 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 67 (1974) There seemed nothing left but to evaluate the work directly. This was not an arduous task; they left little to evaluate. At the same time, reading the collected works of Thomas Todd and Gabriel Duval[l] (Appendices B and C) was no picnic. These masters of insignificance did not leave behind a pile of small, but wellpolished, gems. The opinions are graceless and plodding, saved only by their brevity.
The life work of Justice Todd may be summed up in two words: land tenure. Ten of his fourteen opinions (App. B, Nos. 4-13) involved land tenure disputes. He told us that a deed will not support a writ of entry unless the description of the lands is specific (Nos. 10, 13), that a patent issued by mistake will not support a writ of entry (No. 12), and on and on and on. He apparently acquired this interest while serving on the Supreme Court of Kentucky. 5 Having built up all this human capital, he saw no reason to abandon it, or acquire new knowledge, just because he had changed courts. He apparently took literally the charge that, as a Justice, he construe the Law of the Land. " But see supra note 37 and accompanying text. 45 Israel, supra note 43, at 409.
Todd's remaining four opinions show only disdain for other subjects. He tossed off a laconic and murky dissent in an action on a bond (No. 1) and a laconic and murky concurrence on a jurisdictional point (No. 3) . The Reporter attributed to him four unreasoned lines, designated as an "opinion for the Court" but probably just an oral remark, in M'Kim v. Voorhies (No. 2), a case holding that state courts may not enjoin the judgments of federal courts. 6 If Marshall indeed assigned Todd the opinion in this case, he presented Todd with a magnificent opportunity to disqualify himself from any contest of insignificance; the kindest thing to be said is that Todd dropped the ball.' 7 Finally, there is Todd's last opinion (No. 14), which is a careful, if dull, statement of the "best evidence rule" and a delineation of the adverse inference that may be drawn if one in possession of evidence fails to produce it. The opinion is competent but no more.
Gabriel Duval[l] had broader interests. He wrote on commercial law (App. C, Nos. 1, 15), the rights of the United States to recover debts (Nos. 4, 5, 7, 13), admiralty (Nos. 6, 10, 12), jurisdiction (Nos. 2, 17), land law (Nos. 8, 11, 14) , and statutory construction (Nos. 9, 10, 16). True, some of these opinions are unusual (for example, M'Iver's Lessee v. Walker (No. 8), in which the full opinion reads: "My opinion is that there is no safe rule but to follow the needle[, making full allowance for variation, according to practical observation]." 48 ), but they are in the main workmanlike. 4 9 They display a range of interests and even a competence that Todd carefully concealed.
Although only M'Kim among all of Todd's cases was potentially significant-and then because of the opinion's subject rather than its execution-at least three of Duval [l] 
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[50:481 counts may be attributable to the choices described in the following notes. NOTES: 1. The Justices are listed in order of appointment, with Rutledge, who was an Associate Justice during years the Court did not sit, counted only for his recess appointment as Chief Justice.
2. "Terms" denotes the number of annual sessions of the Court held while the Justice was eligible to sit. An asterisk before the number of Terms indicates that the Justice continued to sit with Chief Justice Chase (Taney's replacement). The additional Terms of these Justices are omitted from this survey. Some years, e.g., 1795, had more than one session but are counted as one Term. In 1850 the commencement of the Court's annual session was changed from January to December; I treat the December 1850 sitting as a Term separate from the January 1850 sitting. The use of the "Term" as a measure of length of service is more accurate than "years served" because Justices sometimes took their seats just after a sitting had ended, or died just before a sitting commenced. There were, moreover, no sittings in 1789, 1790, 1802, and 1811, and the 1791 sitting (which I do not count as a Term) entailed only three inconsequential docket-control acts. The omission of sittings, coupled with the time of appointment of each Justice, could cause "years of service" to overstate by several years the number of times the Justice could have met with the Court. "Terms" includes, however, meetings a Justice missed because of illness, "indisposition," or circuit riding. A judge may achieve insignificance by absence no less than by invisibility while in: attendance.
3. "NOP" indicates the number of opinions the Justice wrote in his career. It includes all majority, seriatim, concurring, and dissenting opinions of any description. Even two-word opinions (e.g., "I dissent") are included. NOP does not include dissents that are noted by the Reporter (e.g., "Mr. Justice Baldwin dissented") or by a colleague (e.g., "I am comforted that Mr. Justice Todd joins me in these views."). A double asterisk in subsequent Appendices indicates such statements not qualifying as opinions. These are included, however, in column 9 (dissenting votes). The number of nondissenting opinions may be extracted by subtracting column 8 (dissenting opinions) from NOP. NOP also does not include short opinions, of a page or less, by the Chief Justice or (in the absence or disqualification of the Chief Justice) the senior Associate Justice announcing the judgment of the Court. These are treated as identical in principle to opinions headed "By the Court" or to dispositions summarized by the Reporter but not attributed to any Justice. The treatment is necessary because the practices of the early Reporters did'not distinguish between short announcements by the presiding Justice and other ways of disposing of a case, and the Reporters do not seem to have had any consistent rule for choosing how to style such short dispositions. Although this treatment significantly reduces the number of opinions attributed to Chief Justices Marshall and Taney and cuts by a few the number attributed to Justices Washington (1812 Term) and Story (1836 Term), it does not otherwise affect the results.
4. "OPY," or opinions per year, is the number of opinions in a Justice's career (column 3) divided by the number of Terms served (column 2). It is a general measure of the Justice's activity.
5. "PPY," or pages per year, is the number of pages of text written by a Justice in his career divided by the number of Terms served (column 2). (One can generate the total number of pages by multiplying column 5 and column 2.) "Pages" means the number of pages in the original edition of each Reporter's volumes. In reprints the starred pagination was used. Each opinion's length was recorded to the nearest tenth of a page. No attempt has been made to convert page measurements to words. Although this might be desirable (the Dallas and Peters volumes, for example, contain more words per page than Cranch or Wheaton), this subtlety was unnecessary for current purposes.
6. "OPTY," or opportunities, gives the number of cases that (according to the Reporters, anyway) came before each Justice for disposition in his career. It includes not only cases disposed of by signed opinions but also cases disposed of "By the Court" and cases with dispositions noted by the Reporters but not otherwise attributed. It also includes matters of practice and procedure that were styled by the Reporters as cases. In some Terms almost all cases were disposed of by signed opinion. In others the number of unsigned (or short, see note 3 above) dispositions was substantial. In the 1809 Term, for example, 44 matters were styled as cases by Cranch, and 23 of them were handled without signed opinion. As each Justice had an opportunity to record his views in each matter, however, the table includes all of them.
7. "OPO," or opinions per opportunity, is column 3 divided by column 6. It measures each Justice's proclivity to place his views in the written records.
8. "DISOP," or dissenting opinions, records the number of signed dissents a Justice filed in his career. See note 3 above. An opinion was counted as a dissent if it disagreed in any particular with the Court's disposition of the case. An opinion agreeing with the disposition but disagreeing with the reasons was counted as a concurrence.
9. "DISV," or dissenting votes, records the number of times a Justice was noted by anyone (the Reporter, a colleague, or himself) as having disagreed with the disposition of a case.
10. "DPY," or-dissents per year, is column 9 divided by column2. 14. Riggs v. Tayloe, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 483 (1824) (4.2-page opinion for the Court holding that when one party to a contract loses his copy, the other party must produce his own or the first party would be allowed to introduce secondary evidence). 4. United States v. January, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 572 (1813) (three-page opinion for the Court holding that funds collected from a bankrupt federal revenue officer must be applied to the benefit of both of his sureties, not just the first).
APPENDIX B
5. United States v. Patterson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 575 (1813) (1.1-page opinion for the Court holding that a bankrupt revenue officer's personal funds must be applied to discharge his debt to the Treasury).
6. 13. Walton v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 651 (1824) (6.5-page opinion for the Court holding that a particular statute was not repealed by implication, that a revenue collector's bond does not extinguish his personal liability to pay the proceeds, and that bills of exceptions were unnecessary in certain cases).
14. Piles v. Bouldin, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 325 (1826) (6.5-page opinion for the Court holding that under Tennessee law the time required to obtain title to land by adverse possession is seven years).
15. Rhea v. Rhenner, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 105 (1828) (3.5-page opinion for the Court holding that under Maryland law a woman abandoned by her husband may buy and sell goods and property in her own name and is liable for her debts, but may not alienate jointly held real property;, thus a prior creditor prevails over a purported transferee of real property). 
